Power Obfuscation Techniques for Side-Channel Attack Mitigation on FPGAs

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Multi-tenant Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) expose cryptographic circuits to remote power side-channel attacks, in which a malicious co-tenant deploys an on-chip voltage sensor and recovers secret keys from the shared power distribution network (PDN) without physical access to the device. This thesis proposes and evaluates a lightweight countermeasure based on Enhanced Ring Oscillator with Latch (ERO-L) primitives that inject data-independent switching noise into the PDN to degrade the signal-to-noise ratio available to an adversary performing Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). The ERO-L primitive was selected through a structured comparison of several ring oscillator topologies, offering the highest PDN load among designs that satisfy synthesis constraints. Three activation strategies of increasing sophistication are evaluated: static activation, in which the primitive oscillates continuously, periodic activation, in which the enable signal toggles at a fixed frequency during each trace and randomized activation, in which a pseudo-random pattern generated by a linear feedback shift register varies the activation independently for each trace. All strategies are evaluated across 128, 256 and 320 ERO-L instances and at AES clock frequencies of 20, 50 and 100 MHz on a Digilent Nexys A7-100T board, using key rank progression as the primary metric of CPA resistance. The results demonstrate that activation strategy is as consequential as switching intensity. Static activation fails at 100 MHz because its constant contribution is eliminated by CPA preprocessing. Periodic activation can provide meaningful resistance but exhibits critical sensitivity to period length, with poorly chosen parameters accelerating convergence relative to the unprotected baseline. Randomized activation is the only strategy to provide strong, consistent and predictable resistance across all evaluated conditions, preventing CPA convergence within a 20000-trace limit at 320 instances and 100 MHz while consuming only 0.5\% of available LUTs for the ERO-L array and an additional 0.2\% for the randomized controller. These findings establish randomized activation with a sufficiently large instance count as a practical and deployable countermeasure for protecting cryptographic implementations on shared FPGA platforms.

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